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Introduction
One of the best-known virtues of competition is that it provides incentives to …rms and individuals to search for new opportunities to improve upon current practice. For Schumpeter, this process of creative destruction is an essential feature of capitalism. He regards it as a prerequisite for dynamic e¢ ciency. In the present paper we argue that although the continuous search for new opportunities is widely regarded as a social blessing, within …rms it provides a challenge when workers can invest in task-speci…c productivity. In an environment where workers anticipate that current practices or activities are possibly replaced by new tasks, workers may be reluctant to invest in their aptitude to perform their current activities. This reduces their productivity in the current task, which in turn makes it even more likely that management decides to switch to a new task assignment. When workers'investment in task-speci…c human capital is su¢ ciently important, …rms bene…t from reducing the probability of changes in future task assignments. In this paper, we analyze when and how organizations can induce some degree of inertia.
In the management literature, organizational inertia is a much-discussed phenomenon (March 1981 (March , 1991 (Nelson and Winter 1982) . Rigidity and in ‡exibility are typically seen as inherently bad for organizations, as it limits organizations'response to changes in the environment and technology (March 1991 , LeonardBarton 1992, Ford et al. 2008 ). In contrast, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that reliable and accountable organizations have an edge in a competitive environment. This favors organizations that develop a set of routines generating stable outcomes, which become a source of inertia. 1 One source 1 This also implies that inertia will be larger in older organizations, also observed by Downs (1967) in public bureaucracies. Ruef (1997) studies the response of Californian hospitals to the introduction of new technologies and changes in regulation between 1980 and 1990, and …nds that relatively few hospitals o¤er new services in response to these environmental changes. In particular older, larger, and more specialized hospitals are less likely to change. Kelly and Amburgey (1991) …nd that airlines hardly changed their product mix in response to major deregulations in the late 1970's, with older airlines being most inert. Instead, in this period, many new airlines were founded. Studying Finnish newspapers, Amburgey et al. (1993) …nds that older organizations are less likely to change their content and their frequency of publication.
of inertia is known as the competency trap (Levitt and March 1988) , where organizations keep using inferior technologies and procedures because of inexperience with superior alternatives. 2 When employees have vested abilities and knowledge, they may resist changes that reduce the value of their speci…c skills (March 1991 , Rumelt 1995 . While acknowledging this, we argue that organizations can bene…t from cultivating some degree of inertia, exactly because it gives employees incentives to invest in skills speci…c to their current tasks. 3 A key feature of our model is that employees'task pro…ciency increases in experience with performing the task. Evidence on this abounds. Lance et al. (1989) show that for jet engine mechanics, experience with performing a particular task is highly correlated with performance in that task. Schmidt et al. (1986) …nd that for several military occupations, supervisor ratings and work sample performance increase in experience in the job, mostly through an increase in knowledge on how tasks should be performed. In a metaanalysis on the relation between performance and experience, Qui…ones et al. (1995) …nd that both job experience and experience with performing a task are positively correlated with performance, but the correlation between performance and task experience is stronger than the correlation between performance and job experience (see also Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) for evidence of leaning-by-doing in various settings and Waldman et al. (2003) for references on learning-by-doing in health care). 4 It follows that in making investments in task-speci…c human capital, people should take (potential) 2 There is a large literature documenting that the di¤usion of new technology is slow (Griliches, 1957 , Stoneman 1983 , Chari and Hopenhayn 1991, Ja¤e and Stavins 1994, Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994), or that inferior technology remains in use despite superior alternatives (Shama 1983 , David 1985 , Katz and Shapiro 1986 . 3 In the literature on organizational learning and routines (March 1981, Nelson and Winter 1982) it is emphasized that routines are often changed incrementally. Such incremental changes will typically not a¤ect employees' tasks and, hence, are not considered in this paper. The same holds for small changes in product design or marketing strategy. Using Hannan and Freeman (1984) 's hierarchy of organizations' in ‡exible core, changes in organizational goals, forms of authority, and core technology would a¤ect employees' tasks more strongly than changes in marketing strategy. 4 Task-speci…c human capital also matters for labor market outcomes. Using detailed data on tasks performed in di¤erent occupations, Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) show that experience with performing speci…c tasks strongly in ‡uences job mobility and wage growth. People are more likely to switch to jobs that are close to their current job in terms of relative importance of task-speci…c skills, and wage growth for job movers increases in their experience with performing the most important tasks in their new job (see also Poletaev and Robinson 2008).
future changes in tasks into account (Lazear 2009 ). We argue that this provides a rationalization for some degree of organizational inertia. If employees anticipate that their organization responds slowly to future changes in the environment or technology, investments in their current task-speci…c skills are more likely to also be valuable in the future. The cost of inertia is that the organization does not adapt as well as possible to its environment.
Employees may be reluctant to invest time and e¤ort enhancing their productivity in their current task due to uncertainty about future task assignment. Firm-level changes, such as changes in strategy or production technology, reduce the value of employees' earlier strategy-or technologyspeci…c investments. Changes at the job level can have a similar impact.
Consider a university lecturer who is asked to teach a new undergraduate course outside his main research area. He knows that if he will be teaching this course for several years, it is worthwhile to make a big initial investment. However, if within a few years the department hires someone whose research expertise perfectly suits the course, it is likely that the course is shifted to the new hiree, which would imply that the lecturer hardly bene…ts from his initial investment. Similarly, an account manager needs to build up a relation with a new client, but knows that management may decide to reallocate the client to one of his colleagues. A good secretary learns how her superior wants to be supported, but this knowledge has no value when her superior is replaced. Employees'productivity in working with …rm-speci…c IT depends on their investment in grasping all possibilities of the system, which is useless if the …rm switches to a new system. These examples suggest that if employees'investment is su¢ ciently important, organizations could bene…t from introducing policies that reduce the probability of a change in tasks.
In this paper, we …rst study the trade-o¤ between employees'incentives to invest in task-speci…c productivity and optimal task replacement. Next, we analyze (the optimal combination of) several policies that allow organizations to a¤ect this trade-o¤. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model where the agent's …rst-period e¤ort also has a payo¤ in the second period, unless the …rst-period task is replaced in period 2. In period 1, the principal can engage in exploration of an alternative task. This yields information on the productivity of an alternative task relative to the current task. Despite the …rst-period investment in productivity in the initial task, the alternative task can be more productive. We show that the principal su¤ers from a time-inconsistency problem: the principal would bene…t from an ex ante commitment to maintain the current task for a range of tasks' relative productivity where replacement is optimal ex post. Whereas this commitment is costly in terms of sub-optimal second-period task assignment, it bene…ts the principal through an increase in the agent's …rst-period e¤ort spurred by the increased probability that this e¤ort also matters for second-period performance. Such commitment, however, requires veri…able information on tasks'relative productivity, which is typically not present.
The objective of this paper is to analyze how organizations can optimally combine several policies that alleviate the commitment problem described above. In particular, we consider the combination of (i) abstaining from exploration, (ii) managerial vision, (iii) organizational task-speci…c investments, and (iv) incentive pay. We show that strategically abstaining from exploration can be bene…cial, in particular in relatively stable environments as well as when the …rm can invest in task-speci…c productivity alongside the employee's investments. In the absence of exploration, employees are certain that current practices will not be replaced, which increases the payo¤ of investing in task-speci…c skills. The downside is that pro…table alternatives are missed.
We further show that managerial vision or an organizational mission may mitigate the commitment problem, provided that the agent shares the mission. As in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005) , we model managerial vision as a bias of the principal (or manager) towards current activities. This bias is possibly shared by the agent. A direct implication of this bias is that the principal is less inclined to replace the current activity, making it more likely that the agent's …rst-period e¤ort has a payo¤ in the second period. However, from the perspective of a neutral agent, the principal's bias also implies that the task is not replaced when there is moderately better alternative. This reduces the agent's incentive to put in e¤ort. These two e¤ects cancel out, unless the agent (partially) internalizes the mission. Hence, in contrast to the results in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005) , in our setting visionary leadership alone is not enough to make workers more engaged. Workers should be truly inspired. 5 Incentive pay helps to increase …rst-period e¤ort, and thereby alleviates but not eliminates the commitment problem, provided that the employee earns a rent. We show that incentive pay and organizational missions are substitutes. If the organizational mission encourages employees to put in high e¤ort, this yields high cost of incentive pay. Hence, if the organizational mission or managerial vision is more inspiring, monetary incentives are optimally weaker.
Furthermore, we show that both incentive pay and the strength of the organizational mission are optimally higher when the …rm can make taskspeci…c investments. Organizational task-speci…c investments, such as speci…c equipment, software, or training have a lasting e¤ect on the productivity of the initial task, which reduces the probability that the task is replaced.
This, in turn, increases the employee's incentive to invest in task-speci…c skills, which further increases the probability that the …rm's investment has a second-period payo¤. Hence, the …rm's investment and the employee's learning-by doing are complements through their e¤ects on the probability of task replacement, even in the absence of direct interaction e¤ects in the production function. Consequently, organizational policies that increase employee's e¤ort, in particular missions and incentive pay, are more valuable when the …rm makes speci…c investments.
Our …nal results concern comparisons across organizations. The cost of organizational policies that increases employee's investment in task-speci…c human capital by reducing the probability of task replacement depends on the stability of the environment. In volatile environments, reducing ‡exibil-ity is more costly than in stable environments. Hence, we predict that …rms that engage in exploration in relatively stable environments use incentive pay, missions, and task-speci…c investment to a larger extent than …rms in more volatile environments. This implies that even though incentive pay and managerial vision are substitutes, without properly controlling for the volatility of the environment (as well as for organizational investment) we may observe a positive association across organizations. Lastly, we predict that …rms that do not engage in exploration are more specialized and make use of missions and incentive pay to a smaller extent than …rms that do engage in exploration.
We believe that our analysis contributes to the literature on organizamanagers who (try to) motivate agents by installing a sense of a mission in the agents. 
Related Literature
Gibbons and Waldman (2006) introduce task-speci…c human capital, assuming that workers build up task-speci…c skills that are lost when they get promoted to a higher level in the organizational hierarchy. In their framework, this can explain cohort e¤ects in wages, provided that a relatively large fraction of workers who enter the organization in bad times start at a low job level. While in Gibbons and Waldman (2006) task-speci…c capital is accumulated automatically, we study workers' incentive to invest in such task-speci…c skills, knowing that the skills may become obsolete after a change in task assignment. Lazear (2009) argues that …rms di¤er in the relative importance of di¤erent generic skills. He shows that it is less attractive for workers to adjust their investment in skills to their current …rm's skill-weights when the probability of an exogenous layo¤ is large and they are unlikely to …nd another …rm where their skills have similar relative value.
Hence, the current …rm has to pay for part of the investment in generic skills.
In a straightforward reinterpretation of our model, the di¤erent tasks utilize the agent's skills to a di¤erent degree. Technological advances or competitive forces could call for a change in the agent's job design, reducing the value of skill-weight-speci…c investments. 6 Boyer and Robert (2006) explain inertia from a dynamic incentive framework, where the cost of providing incentives for developing successful a project increases in the probability that the project will not be implemented due to the arrival of a more pro…table opportunity ex post. Our paper shares the trade-o¤ between ex ante incentives and ex post project choice that gives rise to some optimal degree of inertia. However, where Boyer and of tasks in an organization on the one hand and the need to adapt tasks to changing local circumstances on the other. They show that organizational rigidity is optimal when coordination is important and adaptation is not important. Coordination is achieved through specialization and the implementation of tasks according to pre-determined rules, at the expensive of a sub-optimal …t with the changing environment.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on managerial decisions 6 Inderst and Mueller (2007) build a hold-up model along these lines, focusing on the ex post incentive of the …rm to change tasks for the sole reason of reducing the rents obtained by the agent. They show that pro…t-sharing reduces the …rm's incentive to exploit the agent's investments. regarding corporate strategy when employees can make strategy-speci…c investments. The possibility of a change in strategy makes employees reluctant to invest in strategy-speci…c projects. Commitment to a particular strategy enhances employees'incentives, at the cost of potentially foregoing pro…table opportunities (Rotemberg and Saloner 1994) . Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005) show that managerial vision, modelled as a bias towards a speci…c strategy, provides employees with more certainty that their strategy-speci…c investments will pay o¤. If managers have reputational concerns, public disclosure of strategic plans serves as commitment to a speci…c strategy (Ferreira and 7 Schaefer (1998) argues that organizational change leads employees to engage in costly in ‡uence activities. This reduces the pro…tability of change and, hence, brings some degree of inertia. Under the assumption that in ‡uence activities are less rewarding when the …rm's prospects are worse, Schaefer (1998) predicts that …rms are more likely to change when their survival is threatened.
The Commitment Problem
Consider a principal, who employs an agent for two periods. In period 1, the agent performs task A. The probability that task A is successfully completed equals the e¤ort the agent puts in the task. By normalization, the value of success (failure) to both the agent and the principal equals 1 (0). Consequently, task A yields an expected bene…t equal to
where e 1 denotes the level of e¤ort the agent exerts in period 1. The cost of …rst-period e¤ort is equal to 1 2 (e 1 ) 2 and is entirely borne by the agent.
At the start of period 1, the principal also makes a decision whether to learn the features of an alternative task, task B. This learning can be interpreted as exploration. Let c denote the cost of exploration to the principal.
We assume that the agent observes the principal's exploration decision before choosing e 1 . If the principal has explored task B during period 1, she can assign the worker to either task A or task B in period 2. In period 2, the probability that task A is successfully completed equals e 1 + e 2;A , where e 2;A is the agent's second-period e¤ort on task A. Hence, in period 2 task
A yields an expected bene…t to both the principal and the agent equal to
Task B yields an expected bene…t to both the principal and the agent equal to U 2 (B) = e 2;B + ;
where e 2;B is the agent's second-period e¤ort on task B, and is a stochastic term, denoting the productivity of task B relative to task A. We assume that is uniformly distributed on [ h; h], such that the expected value E( ) = 0.
If the principal decides to explore task B, at cost c, the principal learns the exact level of before the start of period 2. Second-period e¤ort cost is also borne by the agent and is independent of the assigned task T 2 fA; Bg:
In this section, we assume that there are no veri…able performance measures, so that incentive pay is not feasible. We relax this assumption in the next section. To minimize on notation, we assume that the principal and the agent both value both periods equally, i.e. their discount rate is zero.
The agent's outside-option payo¤ is zero.
Several features of our model are worth emphasizing. First, the agent's …rst-period e¤ort is an investment in task-speci…c productivity. It increases the second-period payo¤ only when task A is maintained. The initial investment is useless in the second period when the task is replaced. Hence, exploration of task B reduces the probability that the initial investment in task-speci…c skills are exploited in period 2.
Second, the assumption that the probability that task B is successfully completed is stochastic while this probability for task A is deterministic is for convenience only. What matters is that in period 2 task B is possibly superior to task A, despite the task A-speci…c skills obtained during period 1.
Placing the uncertainty on task A or adding an identically and independently distributed stochastic term to task A does not a¤ect the results. 8 Third, several interpretations of the two tasks are possible. Task A could be working with the …rm's current technology or strategy, while a potential new technology or strategy would require di¤erent skills from the agent.
The tasks can be seen as di¤erent sets of job requirements, with ex ante uncertainty about which job design matches best with the agent's skills.
Alternatively, relating to the examples in the Introduction, task A can be a speci…c project or client, which could be reassigned to a colleague.
Fourth, the principal and the agent are assumed to have the same expected bene…t from the agent's e¤ort on either task. As a consequence, there is no disagreement among the principal and the agent regarding the decision to maintain or replace task A after period 1. The agent's bene…t could stem from private bene…ts or intrinsic motivation related to the outcomes of tasks, or it could be interpreted as a reduced-form model of incentive pay linked to the project's success. Assuming that the agent's bene…ts are proportionally smaller (or larger) than the principal's bene…ts does not a¤ect the nature of the commitment problem studied in this paper. In Section 4, we will show that allowing for (explicit) incentive pay does not a¤ect the results qualitatively as long as incentives are not perfect.
Fifth, even though the principal's and the agent's bene…ts from both tasks are equal, their preferences regarding e¤ort are not fully aligned as only the agent bears the cost of e¤ort. This implies that the principal prefers the agent to exert more e¤ort than is optimal from the agent's perspective.
Important in this respect is that the agent expects to earn a rent, so that the principal does not have to compensate the agent for additional cost of e¤ort. 9 Lastly, parameters and h determine the relative importance of exploitation and exploration, and, thereby, the cost and bene…ts of commitment. A higher level of implies that the agent's current e¤ort is more responsive to increases in the agent's (current and future) bene…ts of current e¤ort. On the other hand, higher levels of h correspond to higher expected bene…ts from exploration, as the probability that task B is superior to task A in period 2 increases in h.
The timing is as follows. Before period 1, nature draws the realization of the stochastic productivity di¤erence between tasks, , unobserved by the principal and the agent. In period 1, the principal …rst makes a decision whether or not to explore task B. Next, the agent observes the principal's decision and works on task A. If the principal explored task B, she learns and decides on second-period task assignment. The agent works on the task assigned to him. If the principal did not explore task B, the agent performs task A in period 2. Finally, payo¤s are realized.
Throughout, we make the following two assumptions on parameter values. The …rst assumption ensures that both with and without commitment in equilibrium the probability that task A is maintained after exploration in the …rst period is strictly smaller than 1. E¤ectively, this precludes situations where exploration cannot lead to the discovery of a more productive task or technology. Combined with the …rst assumption, the second assumption ensures that the equilibrium probability of project success is always smaller than 1.
Assumption 1: 4 < h:
We solve the game by backward induction. First, consider the e¤ort decision of the agent in period 2. Irrespective of the principal's secondperiod task assignment, the agent exerts e 2;T = .
Next, consider the principal's decision on task assignment. If initially the principal did not explore task B, the agent performs task A by assumption.
Suppose that the principal explored task B. Then, when making the taskassignment decision, she knows e 1 and . Moreover, she anticipates that in period 2 the agent will choose e 2;T = regardless of task assignment. Hence, it is optimal for the principal to keep task A if and only if
as given by (2) and (3), respectively. This implies that the principal keeps task A if < e 1 . From an ex ante perspective, the probability that task A will be maintained in period 2 equals = 1 2h (h + e 1 ), where Assumption 1
ensures that in equilibrium < 1.
Now consider the agent's e¤ort decision in period 1. First, if the principal explores task B, the agent's expected payo¤ equals
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to e 1 and solving the …rst-order condition yield optimal e¤ortẽ 1 :ẽ
E¤ort increases in , the inverse of the cost of e¤ort function, re ‡ecting the agent's responsiveness to incentives. E¤ort decreases in h, as the probability that task A is maintained is decreasing in h. Substituting (5) into the probability of keeping task A as given by = 1 2h (h + e 1 ) yields
Using (5) and (6), we can write equilibrium e¤ort asẽ 1 = (1 +~ ). This expression clearly illustrates that period 1 e¤ort depends on the probability that the principal maintains task A in period 2. In other words, the agent's e¤ort depends on his expectation of future task assignment. Second, it is easily veri…ed that if the principal does not engage in exploration, the agent optimally sets e 1 = 2 .
Let us …nally consider the principal's exploration decision. It follows from the analysis above that if the principal explores task B, her ex ante expected payo¤ equals
If the principal does not explore task B, the agent's e¤orts yield a payo¤ to the principal equal to 5 . Comparing this to (7), it follows that exploring task B yields a higher payo¤ to the principal than not exploring task B if
Equation (8) de…nes the range of parameters for which the principal chooses to explore task B. Not surprisingly, if the cost of exploration are too large, the principal refrains from exploring. More interestingly, using Assumption 1, it is easily derived that there exists ranges of h and for which the principal chooses not to explore task B even when c = 0. 10 The explanation for this result is that by not exploring task B, the principal induces the agent to expend more e¤ort in period 1. To put it di¤erently, the probability that task A will be replaced in period 2 discourages the agent to invest in task A. As we discuss below, the principal faces a commitment problem when engaging in exploration. Abstaining from exploration can be seen as a device to alleviate -but not eliminate -the commitment problem.
The key feature of our game is the presence of a time-inconsistency problem in case of exploration. Once e 1 is …xed, it is best to maintain task A if < e 1 . The problem is that this ex post optimal replacement decision does not take the e¤ect on the agent's …rst-period e¤ort into account. To determine the ex ante optimal replacement decision, suppose that an exploring principal can commit herself to keep task A if < z. Proposition 1 gives the main result of the base model. 
Proof.
Given that task A is maintained if < z, the agent anticipates that with probability C = 1 2h (h + z) he will continue working on task A in period 2. Therefore, …rst-period e¤ort results from maximizing
. The agent's e¤ort is increasing in z, as the probability that the agent works on task A increases in z. The principal's total expected payo¤ can now be written as
Maximizing (9) whereẽ 1 and~ are given by (5) and (6), respectively. As z C > e C 1 , it is possible that task A is maintained even though task B would yield moderately higher payo¤. Substituting for z C into the principal's payo¤ under commitment (9) yields
Comparing the principal's payo¤ of exploration with commitment (10) to the payo¤ of exploration without commitment (7), we obtain
This expression decreases in h and increases in .
Commitment yields higher payo¤ to the principal. This is despite the fact that z C > e C 1 : the principal commits to maintaining task A for values of for which she ex post prefers to replace task A. The explanation for this …nding is as follows. In determining for which values of to keep the agent on task A, the principal faces a trade-o¤. On the one hand, …rst-period e¤ort increases in the probability that the agent works on task A in period 2, which in turn increases in the range of values of for which the principal commits to keep task A (i.e. in z). On the other hand, a higher z increases the expected cost that arises from the possibility that task A is maintained while task B is more productive. The latter cost of an increase in z is zero starting from the situation without commitment, while the additional e¤ort that follows from an increase in z is a …rst-order bene…t.
Hence, commitment is always bene…cial to the principal. The optimal level of z balances the bene…t of additional e¤ort with the increase in the expected loss from maintaining relatively unproductive activities.
Crucial for Proposition 1 is that the additional cost of e¤ort are borne by the agent, not by the principal. This disalignment gives rise to all results in this paper. If the principal would bear the full cost of e¤ort or, equivalently, if the principal and the agent would be the same person, the outcome with commitment would be the same as the outcome without commitment.
The comparative statics in Proposition 1 can be explained as follows.
Optimal commitment increases the probability that task A is maintained, which gives incentives to the agent to exert extra e¤ort. As measures the responsiveness of the agent's e¤ort to incentives, these bene…ts of commitment increase with . Parameter h re ‡ects the degree of uncertainty on the optimal second-period task assignment, with the probability of a change in task increasing in h. For larger values of h, the principal needs to commit to maintaining task A is for an even larger range of realizations of , where maintaining task A is even more sub-optimal, in order to obtain a given increase in the probability of maintaining task A. Hence, commitment is 
Corollary 1a follows from comparing (8) and (11).
Corollary 1a Under commitment, exploration occurs for a wider range of parameters.
In the absence of commitment power, abstaining from exploration can be seen as a commitment device, increasing the agent's …rst-period e¤ort.
However, this comes at the cost of a potentially sub-optimal second-period task assignment. Commitment power would give the principal the possibility to engage in exploration while reducing -but not eliminating -the probability that exploration induces a change in task. This allows for a better balance between the cost and bene…ts of exploration, making exploration attractive in more situations. In particular, expression (11) shows that with commitment power, exploration is always optimal if exploration cost c = 0, in contrast to the situation without commitment.
In many situations, commitment is not possible. The (expected) bene…t of tasks and the realization of ex ante uncertain bene…t-relevant variables are often not veri…able, so that contracting is not feasible. Moreover, if the realization of is such that e C 1 < < z C , both the principal and the agent would bene…t from renegotiating a contract that stipulates continuing with task A. In the remainder of this paper, we consider several organizational policies that can reduce the time-inconsistency problem in the absence of commitment power. In the next section, we consider the combined merit of task-speci…c investments by the principal, organizational missions, and incentive pay. We …rst revisit the possibility to abstain from exploration altogether in the following Corollary, which follows from equation (8) .
Corollary 1b In the absence of commitment power, abstaining from exploration can be bene…cial to the principal. The bene…ts of refraining from exploration increase in and decrease in h.
The take-away from Corollary 1b is that organizations are sometimes better o¤ refraining from pursuing innovations. While innovations in technology, strategy, or job design can bring higher productivity, the prospect of these possible innovations reduce employees'investments in skills speci…c to their current tasks. 11 In the management literature, the fundamental trade-o¤ between exploiting current skills and knowledge on the one hand and exploring new alternatives on the other has been extensively discussed following March (1991) . The typical stance in the management literature is that balancing both activities (being 'ambidextrous') is di¢ cult but necessary (Benner and Tushman 
Organizational responses to the commitment problem
The previous section has shown that if task-speci…c investment and exploration are both su¢ ciently important, the principal su¤ers from a commitment problem. In this section, we discuss three ways in which organizations can mitigate the commitment problem. First, we allow the principal to make initial investments that have a lasting e¤ect on the likelihood of success when the agent performs task A. Second, we allow the principal and the agent to have biased preferences for task A. Third, we allow the principal to use monetary incentives to boost the agent's e¤ort in period 1. We …rst describe the three extensions separately, and then integrate them jointly into the model to determine the optimal mix of organizational policies. Throughout most of this section, we assume that the principal explores task B during the …rst period. We revisit the question whether it is optimal to engage in exploration at the end of this section.
Extension 1: (Over-)investment in task-speci…c productivity
In the basic model, all investments in task-speci…c human capital were made by the employee. However, …rms may also be able to make task-speci…c investments. For instance, equipment can be …ne-tuned to a particular technology or task. Alternatively, the …rm can o¤er or pay for task-speci…c training of the employee, or facilitate bonding between employees and clients.
Insofar as the cost and bene…ts of such investments fall into the same period, it has no e¤ect on the time-inconsistency problem that we consider in this paper. However, when the …rm's current task-speci…c investment has e¤ects that last into future periods, it a¤ect the employee's ex post optimal task assignment and thereby the employee's own task-speci…c investment.
We extend the basic model by assuming that the principal can make a task A-speci…c investment I at the beginning of period 1. This investment is made before the agent exerts e¤ort and can be observed by the agent.
Investing I yields a cost to the principal in the …rst period equal to 1 2
Investing increases the probability of success in the second period by I, but only if the agent works on task A in period 2. 12 Note that there is no direct complementarity between the principal's and the agent's investment in task-speci…c productivity; all e¤ects on the agent's e¤ort run through the larger probability of maintaining task A after period 1. This implies that the principal's and agent's expected bene…t from task A in period 2 are given by:
As the principal's investment increases the probability of success when using task A in period 2, we need to modify Assumption 1 to ensure that exploration can discover an alternative that is superior to task A: We extend the basic model to analyze whether an organizational mission can help to alleviate the time-consistency problem identi…ed in the previous section. We de…ne an organization's mission as a preference of the principal and the agent for a given course of action. We model an organization's mission as a strict preference on the side of the principal for task A. Speci…cally, we assume that at the beginning of period 2 the principal assigns task A to the agent if the following condition holds:
where p > 0 is the principal's predisposition towards task A. The parameter p re ‡ects an intrinsic preference for task A or re ‡ects that the principal receives higher perks if task A is chosen. This is akin to mission preferences as in Besley and Ghatak (2005) , see also Francois (2007) . If the principal is unbiased herself, she can achieve the same e¤ects by delegating the decision on task assignment after period 1 to a third person with predisposition p, as in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005) .
The extent to which the organizational mission is internalized by the agent is modeled as a preference of the agent for working on task A equal to p, with 0 1. 13 The agent's expected bene…t from working on task A in period 2 equals
Extension 3: Incentive pay
The basic model showed that the principal's lack of commitment results in sub-optimally low e¤ort in the …rst period. So far, we have abstained from explicit monetary incentives. This third extension analyzes whether the principal can overcome the time-inconsistency problem by introducing incentive pay, in a limited liability setup. As we will show, incentives mitigate but do not eliminate the commitment problem.
We assume that at the beginning of the game the principal o¤ers the agent a contract, consisting of (1) a base wage w t in each period, and (2) a bonus F if A has been successfully completed in period 1. 14 We assume that the agent's outside-option payo¤ is zero and that he is protected by limited liability. The implication is that the payment in each period must be nonnegative. It follows directly that the optimal contract from the perspective of the principal has a zero base wage in both periods, w t = 0. Important to note is that through the assumption of limited liability, the cost of providing incentive pay to the principal exceeds the cost of e¤ort of the agent. Hence, the agent earns a rent. The introduction of incentive pay into the model implies that U A 1 = p + e 1 (1 + F ) and U 1 = p + e 1 (1 F ). 15 1 3 This speci…cation implies that we neglect the possibility that the agent is intrinsically motivated to work on task A, independent of the organizational mission. It is straightforward to show that an intrinsic motivation to work on task A leads to higher …rst-period e¤ort. 1 4 We focus on incentive pay as a means to increase …rst-period e¤ort. A bonus for success in the second period also provides incentives for e¤ort in the …rst period, but in the current setting, …rst-period and second-period bonuses are substitutes. We assume here that success of task A is veri…able. Instead, we could also have assumed that the principal's task assignment is veri…able. By making the bonus dependent on the taskassignment decision, we would introduce another distortion into the model. The manager would have an incentive to assign task B to avoid giving a bonus (see Rotemberg and Saloner, 1993) . 1 5 We keep the intrinsic preference for success of the agent here to facilitate the comparison with the previous sections. None of the results in this section changes qualitatively
Analysis
The optimal combination of organizational policies aimed at alleviating the time-inconsistency problem can be found by taking the same steps as in the previous section. Irrespective of p, , I, and F , in period 2 the agent will choose e 2;T = for T = fA; Bg. The probability that a biased principal with predisposition p keeps the agent on task A equals the probability that < p + I + e 1 (p; ; I; F ), which is equal to
Clearly, if p and I are su¢ ciently large, the principal keeps task A for any realization of . Assumptions 1a and 2 ensure that in equilibrium < 1.
First-period e¤ort results from maximizing the agent's expected payo¤
with respect to e 1 , yielding e 1 (p; ; I; F ) = (3h + p + I + 2hF ) 2h :
E¤ort increases in bonus F , which is not surprising. E¤ort also increases in I. The principal's task-speci…c investment makes task A more valuable in period 2, which increases the probability that task A is maintained. Together, these e¤ects imply that the agent's incentive to exert e¤ort in period 1 increases in I.
To understand the e¤ect of p on e¤ort three e¤ects have to be distinguished. First, a more biased principal is more likely to keep the worker on task A, which makes it more rewarding to make task-speci…c investments.
Second, a more biased principal continues less rewarding tasks. The secondperiod payo¤ to the agent when his marginal unit of e¤ort makes that task A is kept (makes the principal indi¤erent between the tasks) is decreasing in p, which reduces the agent's incentive to invest in task A. These two e¤ects when the agent is assumed to derive less private bene…ts from successful implementation of the task than the principal. While smaller private bene…ts for the agent increase the scope for incentive pay, commitment always increases the principal's payo¤.
of p on e 1 cancel out. 16 Third, an agent who shares the principal's mission wants to continue working on the task. This motivates him to expend high e¤ort. This positive e¤ect of p on e¤ort implies that the organization's mission statement is partially a self-ful…lling prophecy: the increased e¤ort of the agent makes it even more likely that the organization will continue with its stated tasks. However, the bias of the principal comes at the cost of a these have adopted the mission, but it also reduces ‡exibility.
We are now ready to determine the optimal investmentÎ, mission,p, and bonus,F . Assuming that the principal's predisposition is not a part of total surplus, the optimal values of p, I, and F are given in the following proposition. 17 Proposition 2 The optimal combination of the …rm's task-speci…c investment, organizational mission, and incentive pay is given bŷ 1 6 In the Appendix, we show that if is not uniformly distributed and the principal is more biased than the agent ( < 1), the two e¤ects may not fully cancel out. In particular, if the density of is strictly decreasing over the interval [0; h], there is an additional positive e¤ect of p on e¤ort from the fact that higher e¤ort decreases the probability of continuation of the less rewarding task.
Proof. Maximizing the principal's expected payo¤ as given by
with respect to p, I, and F , with given by (12) and e 1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13), yields …rst-order conditions
and
respectively. Solving this system of three equations yields the expressions forÎ,p, andF .
Before further discussing the implications of Proposition 2, it is useful to discuss how each of the three organizational policies works in isolation. We …rst focus on the optimal organizational mission p. Assuming that I = 0 and F = 0; rewriting (19) gives
Assumption 1a guarantees that p > 0 for any > 0. Proposition 3 follows.
Proposition 3 Assuming that I = 0 and F = 0, the optimal predisposition p is given by (21) , which is positive if and only if > 0. p increases in and and decreases in h. The organizational mission fully resolves the commitment problem only when = 1.
Proof. The comparative statics of , , and h follow directly from (21) . Substituting for p, I = 0, and F = 0 into the principal's expected payo¤ (17) with given by (12) and e 1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13) and subtracting this from the principal's expected payo¤ under commitment as given by (10) gives
which is equal to zero only when = 1.
Proposition 3 shows that the commitment problem can be reduced by delegating the decision on second-period task choice to a person biased in favor of maintaining the task. This organizational mission (or biased view of the principal) induces the agent to exert more e¤ort in the …rst period, but only when the agent (partially) internalizes the mission. The additional e¤ort, in turn, further increases the probability that the principal maintains task A. However, the mission comes at the cost of keeping tasks that objectively should be replaced. 18 The optimal mission has the same e¤ect as commitment only if it is fully shared by the agent, i.e. when = 1. For < 1, the mission is less e¤ective in inducing the agent to exert additional …rst-period e¤ort as compared to optimal commitment based on the realization of as discussed in Section 3. This di¤erence can be explained as follows. Both under commitment and under a partially internalized mission, task A is sometimes maintained while the agent wants the task to be replaced after period 1. The agent prefers to reduce this possibility, which is possible under commitment as higher e¤ort reduces the range of realizations of for which task A is maintained ex post while task B yields higher payo¤.
In case of a partially internalized mission, however, e¤ort is less rewarding as higher e¤ort implies that the task is maintained for even lower realizations of . Hence, the agent exerts more e¤ort under optimal commitment as compared to a partially internalized organizational mission.
The results in Proposition 3 correspond to Beckman (2006) , who shows that if the founding team of a young …rm is more homogenous in terms of prior work a¢ liations, the …rm puts more emphasis on exploitation. Founding teams with diverse background are more likely to engage in exploration.
More diversity may bring lower agreement on the right course of action, yielding more explorative activities. In terms of our model, a more homogenous team is less likely to change course due to shared (but possibly mistaken) belief in current activities. This facilitates exploitation.
In earlier work on managerial vision, Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) and Van den Steen (2005) show that an unbiased principal can bene…t from delegating project choice to a manager biased in favour of a certain type of projects. In both papers, a strong or biased belief of the manager about the future state of the organization encourages employees to work hard on projects that are in line with the manager's vision, even when they do not share the manager's vision. In contrast to these papers, employees in our model do not only care about whether their project is implemented, but also about the success of the implemented project. This implies that managerial vision by itself does not motivate employees, as the e¤ect of managerial vision is to continue projects that should be replaced, which is demotivating.
In line with Wilson (1989) , only when the vision is adopted by the employees (19) that missions and incentive pay are also substitutes in our framework, as discussed in Corollary 2a below.
Next, let us focus on the principal's task-speci…c investment. In the absence of organizational missions and incentive pay, the optimal level of investment is given by (18) with p = 0 and F = 0. This yields
where Assumption 1a ensures that I > 0. The next proposition shows that I is larger than the optimal level in the absence of the time-inconsistency problem.
Proposition 4 Assuming that p = 0 and F = 0, the principal's optimal task A-speci…c investment I is given by (22) . I increases in and and decreases in h. This level of I is beyond the optimal level of investment when the agent's e¤ ort would be …xed at its equilibrium level.
Proof. The comparative statics of , , and h follow directly from (22) . Substituting for I , p = 0, and F = 0 into the agent's e¤ort (13) yields
. Fixing employee e¤ort at e, the optimal investment is given by maximizing the principal's expected payo¤ (17) with given by (12) , e = e, and p = F = 0 with respect to I, which gives I = (h+ e) 2h
.
Subtracting this level of I from the optimal level I and substituting for e yields 2h (2h )
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1a.
The principal will use the opportunity to invest in task A's second period productivity even when the employees' e¤ort would not respond to the investment, simply because it directly raises the probability of success in the second period. However, Proposition 4 shows that the timeinconsistency problem leads the principal to choose an even higher investment level. Thereby, it is more likely that task A will be maintained, which makes it more likely that the agent's …rst-period e¤orts also have a secondperiod payo¤. It follows that …rm's and employees'task-speci…c investments are complements, even when there is no direct complementarity in the production function.
The optimal level of investment is higher when investment cost are lower (higher ), which is not surprising. I increases in , for two reasons. First, a high level of implies a larger level of e¤ort. This yields a higher probability that task A is maintained, increasing the likelihood that the principal's investment pays o¤. This e¤ect also arises in the absence of the time-inconsistency problem. Second, a high level of implies a larger responsiveness of e¤ort to additional bene…ts of e¤ort, which increases the marginal bene…t of extra investment. The e¤ects of h are similar: a high h implies a low probability of maintaining task A; both directly and through lower e¤ort. It also implies that the agent has a weaker response to increases in I, as it only has a small e¤ect on the probability of maintaining task A.
Lastly, we focus on the use of incentive pay to alleviate the commitment problem. In the absence of organizational missions and the principal's taskspeci…c investment, the optimal level of bonus F for …rst-period success is given by (20) with p = 0 and I = 0, which yields
This yields Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Assuming that p = 0 and I = 0, the optimal bonus F is given by (23) . F increases in and decreases in h. The use of incentive pay reduces but does not eliminate the commitment problem.
Proof. The comparative statics of and h follow directly from (23) . Substituting for F and p = I = 0 into the principal's expected payo¤ (17) with given by (12) and e 1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13) yields
Subtracting this from the principal's expected payo¤ without incentives as given by (7) yields
while comparing it to the principal's expected payo¤ under commitment as given by (10) gives
where the inequalities follows from Assumption 1a.
Incentive pay yields bene…ts through higher …rst-period e¤ort, which also generates extra payo¤ in the second period if task A is maintained. 19 The expected cost of incentive pay depends on the probability that the bonus is actually paid out, i.e. on the probability of …rst-period success.
Given our assumption of limited liability on the side of the agent, the more e¤ort the agent exerts in the absence of incentive pay, the higher the cost of incentive pay. Hence, the optimal bonus balances between providing additional incentives for e¤ort and paying for infra-marginal units of e¤ort.
Proposition 5 shows that incentive pay does not fully resolve the commitment problem. Like commitment, incentive pay increases …rst-period e¤ort.
However, the cost of incentive pay is larger than the cost of commitment (provided that it would be possible to commit). Starting from the outcome of the base model, commitment only yields a second-order cost to the principal. Incentives, by contrast, yield a strictly positive cost to the principal, as the limited liability constraint implies that providing incentives to the agent yields a rent to the agent. Moreover, the cost of commitment decreases due to the additional e¤ort provided, whereas the cost of incentive pay increases in e¤ort. A direct implication is that if incentive pay and commitment would both be possible, the principal would only use commitment to incentivize the agent.
The comparative statics in Proposition 5 can be explained as follows.
A large implies that the agent's e¤ort is very responsive to incentives, increasing the bene…ts of incentive pay. However, it also yields high e¤ort in the absence of incentive pay, implying higher cost of the use of incentive pay.
The …rst e¤ect outweighs the second e¤ect. Similarly, a large h implies that a given increase in e¤ort leads only to a small increase in the probability of success. Hence, the agent responds weakly to incentives when h is large.
This e¤ect outweighs the e¤ect of lower cost of incentive pay through lower (infra-marginal) e¤ort.
Proposition 5 implies that if incentive pay is imperfect, other organizational responses to reduce the commitment problem can be more e¤ective than incentive pay or can be used jointly with incentive pay. This brings us back to Proposition 2, which shows that, if possible, the principal optimally uses a mixture of organizational missions, task-speci…c investments, and incentive pay. We now discuss the three main insights that Proposition 2 yields. Corollary 2a presents the …rst insight.
Corollary 2a Stronger internalization of the organizational mission (higher ) leads to a stronger mission p, weaker incentive pay F , and higher investment I.
Organizational missions and incentive pay are substitutes. If a mission is more e¤ective (higher ), the strength of the organizational mission p increases, whereas the optimal bonus F decreases. For a given level of incentive pay, an increase in leads to higher e¤ort, both directly and through the accompanying increase in mission p. This makes it more likely that the principal has to pay out the bonus, leading to an increase in the cost of providing incentive pay. If the mission is fully internalized by the agent ( = 1), the principal optimally abstains from using incentive pay, Corollary 2b Lower cost of …rm's task-speci…c investment (higher ) leads to higher investment I, a stronger mission p, and stronger incentive pay F .
The principal's investment in task A-speci…c productivity is complementary to both incentive pay and the strength of the organizational mission.
The bene…ts of this investment depends on the probability that task A is maintained, which depends positively on the agent's …rst-period e¤ort. In other words, as the principal's investment and the agent's e¤orts are complements through their task-speci…c nature, other policies that increase the agent's e¤ort become more rewarding as I increases. This implies that …rms that engage in exploration but also want to provide incentives for investment in current task-speci…c human capital are most successful when implementing a coherent set of policies concerning investment, missions, and incentives.
These policies reduce the probability that the …rm's explorative activities leads to actual changes. From an ex post perspective, the …rm has too high barriers to change, yielding excess inertia. However, it is exactly this excess inertia that makes it worthwhile for employees to invest in speci…c skill formation.
Third, the three organizational responses to the commitment problem move together when the environment changes. In particular, if e¤ort is more important or rewarding (higher ) or if the environment is more stable (lower h), the principal optimally chooses a stronger mission, invests more in task A-speci…c productivity, and sets stronger incentive pay. These comparative statics follows from expressions (14) , (15) , and (16), and are captured in Corollary 2c.
Corollary 2c
Optimal investmentÎ, missionp, and incentive payF increase (decrease) in ( h).
The implication of these results is that even though incentive pay and organizational missions are substitutes in inducing workers to invest in taskspeci…c skills, across organizations or even across tasks within an organization, incentive pay may go hand in hand with organizational missions. Organizations in more volatile environments optimally maintain some ‡exibility by reducing task-speci…c investments and limiting the strength of the orga-nizational mission and incentive pay. Similarly, when an employee's e¤ort responds strongly to incentives, organizations combine incentive pay with strong missions and high task-speci…c investments. 20 Our model predicts that in ambidextrous …rms, the return to exploration decreases in the strength of speci…c investments (both by the …rm and by employees) and of incentive pay, and in the emphasis on organizational missions. Hence, from a positive perspective, our analysis provides predictions on how the relation between ambidexterity and …rm performance is a¤ected by other organizational policies, as called for by Raisch et al. (2009) . From a normative perspective, a direct implication of Corollary 2c is that more emphasis on exploration should go hand in hand with less speci…c investments (both by the …rm and by employees), weaker incentive pay, and less emphasis on organizational missions.
To conclude our analysis, we show that if the principal decides not to engage in exploration, the principal neither uses incentive pay nor organizational missions to induce additional e¤ort. She does invest in task A-speci…c productivity, but only because this raises the expected probability of success in the second period. This investment does not a¤ect the agent's …rst-period e¤ort.
Proposition 6
If the principal does not engage in exploration, she optimally sets F = 0 and I = . The organizational mission p is irrelevant.
A larger and the possibility to use incentive pay make exploration more attractive relative to not exploring, while the relative attractiveness of exploration decreases in .
Proof. See Appendix. Organizational missions do not a¤ect e¤ort when the principal does not engage in exploration, because in this situation the agent cannot a¤ect the probability that task A is maintained. Furthermore, incentive pay is too costly due to the large (infra-marginal) …rst-period e¤ort that arises because the agent is certain that task A is maintained in period 2. For the same reason, the principal optimally makes high task-speci…c investments. 21 As in Section 3, the downside of abstaining from exploration is that pro…table alternatives cannot be discovered.
It follows that compared to the base model in Section 3, exploration becomes more attractive when missions are e¤ective (high ) as well as well the principal can use incentive pay. Both policies reduce the time-inconsistency problem that leads to sub-optimally low e¤ort, and thereby reduce the cost of exploration. The principal's task-speci…c investment, on the other hand, increases the expected probability of second-period success under exploration but increases the probability of success without exploration even further.
Hence, part of the cost of not engaging in exploration can be recovered through higher investment, making exploration less attractive.
Proposition 6 yields the following prediction. Firms that do not engage in exploration are specialized, in the sense that employees have strong speci…c skills and are likely to work with speci…cally designed equipment or software. These employees receive little incentive pay, although their pay can be tied to the …rm's performance. These …rms have no visionary leaders, but aim to be experts in their …elds, and respond slowly to changes in their environment. This corresponds to Ruef (1997) , who documents that more specialized hospitals are less likely to respond to changes in the regulatory environment.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a simple principal-agent model of investments in task-speci…c human capital and task assignment when employees are uncertain about future task assignment. We have shown that organizations can use a combination of organizational missions, incentive pay, and taskspeci…c investment to reduce the probability of a change in tasks beyond the ex post optimal level. Even though the optimal combination yields excess inertia from an ex post perspective, organizations expect to bene…t from increased employee investment in task-speci…c skills. The most important predictions that follow from our analysis are the following. First, incentive pay and missions are substitutes. Second, …rm's speci…c investments are 2 1 If the principal can commit to maintain task A whenever < z, a similar result arises: the principal neither uses missions nor incentive pay and makes relatively high task-speci…c investments.
complementary to both incentive pay and missions. Third, the strength of missions, incentive pay, and speci…c investments is lower in organizations that operate in environments were exploration is relatively important compared to organizations that operate in more stable environments. Fourth, the return to (more) exploration in ambidextrous …rms decreases in the strength of missions, incentive pay, and speci…c investments (both by the …rm and by the employees).
The impact of extending our two-period model to a multi-period model depends on the rate of decay of task-speci…c human capital. Under high rates of decay, organizations optimally maintain the lower probability of task change. If decay is slow and the learning curve is strictly concave in past e¤orts, the bene…ts of excess inertia reduce over time. Hence, …rms may initially set policies that reduce the probability of task change, and later revert to policies that reduce inertia. This can give rise to punctu- A higher p has a positive e¤ect on incentives through an increase in the probability of maintaining task A, G(e 1 + p), but the last term on the lefthand side shows that it also has a negative e¤ect through a decrease in the bene…t of the marginally maintained task (i.e. when = e 1 + p, which happens with probability g(e 1 + p), yielding a payo¤ that is p lower than the agent's payo¤ from switching to task B). Totally di¤erentiating gives de 1 dp = pg 0 (e 1 + p) g(e 1 + p) pg 0 (e 1 + p) 1 :
As the numerator is the second-order condition for optimal e¤ort, which must be negative, the sign of this expression depends on whether g( ) is increasing or decreasing at = e 1 +p. With a uniform distribution, g 0 ( ) = 0, so that e¤ort is constant in p. If g( ) is bell-shaped and symmetric around zero, we have that g( ) is strictly decreasing in for 0 < < h, and e¤ort increases in p.
The intuition is as follows. An increase in p has three e¤ects. First, a higher probability of continuing task A. Second, the average productivity of task B given a change in tasks is higher, as the payo¤ of the marginal task increases in p. These two e¤ects cancel out. Third, a change in the probability that the agent's marginal e¤ort results in continuation (which the agent prefers to avoid as task B is better from his perspective given that realization of ). When density function g( ) is decreasing over [0; h], the probability that the agent's marginal e¤ort is pivotal decreases in p.
Proof of Proposition 6
Without exploration, the optimal …rst-period e¤ort for the agent is e 1 = (2 + F ). The principal maximizes U 1 + U 2 = e 1 (1 F ) 1 2 I 2 + e 1 + I + with respect to p, F , and I. This shows that p is irrelevant. First-order conditions for I and F are, respectively, I +1 = 0 and (2 + F )+2 = 0, implying that I = and F = 0. Substituting this into the principal's payo¤ function yields
With exploration, the principal's payo¤ is given by using (14) , (15) , and (16) to substitute forp,Î, andF , respectively, in the principal's expected payo¤ (17) with M given by (12) and e 1 (p; ; I; F ) by (13) . This gives Lastly, that the possibility to use incentive pay makes exploration relatively more attractive follows directly from the fact that the principal's payo¤ without exploration does not depend on bonus F while the principal optimally sets a positive bonus in case of exploration.
